Add to Calendar 04/01/2014 16:15:00 04/01/2014 17:45:00 15 Economics Research Seminar In response to the rise in health spending in the US, which totaled nearly $9000 per capita in 2012, insurers and government payers use two mechanisms to direct spending toward the most valuable treatments. The rst set, \demand-side" incentives, impose costs on the patient to limit moral hazard. The second set, "supply-side" incentives, use the physician's payment as a tool to minimize agency conflicts. I design a new test of the relative e ectiveness of these two avenues in maximizing the value of treatment choices. Using variation in patients' and physicians' exposure to incentives, I find new evidence that physician-directed incentives may raise long-run costs. Physicians reduce oce-based primary care in response to new payment regimes, substituting prescription drugs as well as referrals for speciality care. Short-run costs fall, but patients relapse at higher rates. I discuss the likely mechanism generating this trade-o and its implication for disease-speci c insurance design. Please join the Economics Department for a research seminar. This event is open to all Case Western Reserve University faculty, Ph.D. students, economic majors and minors, and those interested in Peter B. Lewis Building, 11119 Bellflower Road, Room 118, Cleveland, OH, 44106-7235, United States Economics Department tmk4@case.edu MM/DD/YYYY

Economics Research Seminar

Physician vs. Patient Incentives in Prescription Drug Choice

Sponsored by: Economics Department

Speaker(s): Michael Dickstein, Ph.D., Stanford University

Date & Time: Tuesday, April 1, 2014 from 4:15 p.m. to 5:45 p.m.

In response to the rise in health spending in the US, which totaled nearly $9000 per
capita in 2012, insurers and government payers use two mechanisms to direct spending toward the most valuable treatments. The rst set, \demand-side" incentives, impose costs on the patient to limit moral hazard. The second set, "supply-side" incentives, use the physician's payment as a tool to minimize agency conflicts. I design a new test of the relative e ectiveness of these two avenues in maximizing the value of treatment choices. Using variation in patients' and physicians' exposure to incentives, I find new evidence that physician-directed incentives may raise long-run costs. Physicians reduce oce-based primary care in response to new payment regimes, substituting prescription drugs as well as referrals for speciality care. Short-run costs fall, but patients relapse at higher rates. I discuss the likely mechanism generating this trade-o and its implication for disease-speci c insurance design.

Please join the Economics Department for a research seminar.  This event is open to all Case Western Reserve University faculty, Ph.D. students, economic majors and minors, and those interested in economics research.
 
Contact Information:

Teresa Kabat
teresa.kabat@case.edu
216.368.4110

Location
Peter B. Lewis Building
11119 Bellflower Road, Room 118
Cleveland, OH 44106-7235
United States

Attachment: Physician vs. Patient Incentives in Prescription Drug Choice

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